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THE RIGHT OF THE PRESS TO GATHER
INFORMATION UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of the press has long been regarded as one of the most im-
portant liberties of a free society. In England, before the American
Revolution, the courts regarded freedom of the press as essential to the
existence of a free state and held that no previous restraint could be
laid upon publication.' The importance of freedom of the press to the
framers of the United States Constitution was demonstrated by its in-
clusion in the Bill of Rights.
2
Although the framers of the Constitution considered a free press to
be of importance, the meaning they attached to the provision for free-
dom of the press is unclear. The House debates regarding its meaning
are not revealing3 and there are no records of debates in the Senate.4
However, it is likely that the framers envisioned a freedom for the press
which was more extensive than that granted under the English com-
mon-law view. As Judge Thomas Cooley explained:
The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but
any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such
free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential
to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.5
Thus, the protection provided by the first amendment appears to ex-
tend beyond a bar against the traditional previous restraints upon pub-
lication, such as censorship, to the point of prohibiting governmental
actions which function as previous restraints upon publication. Broad
1. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *151-52.
2. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievance."
3. The House debates regarding the first amendment primarily concerned the provision
regarding the right to assemble. I ANNALS OF CONG. 731-49 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
4. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRE-
TATION, S. Doc. No. 920-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 936 (1973).
5. 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886 (8th ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited as
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS]. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-50
(1936); Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19-21 (1941) [hereinafter cited as
FREE SPEECH]; T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300-02
(3d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL PRINCIPLES]. Bqt see L. LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION 3 & 18-87 (1960).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
first amendment protection secures the right to a free discussion of pub-
lie events.6 However, the scope of this right is not clearly established in
all aspects. For example, while the right to a free discussion of public
events is clearly protected, the extent to which the press has a protected
right to gather information which, when disseminated, may be a basis
for such discussion, is unclear.
This comment will analyze the recognition, development, and scope
of the right of the press to gather information. A suggested approach
for determining the types of information to which the press should be
allowed access will also be discussed.
II. THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION
One commentator has stated that the guarantee of freedom of the
press protects a societal interest, the interest in the attainment of truth,
so that this nation may knowledgeably choose a course of action and
follow it in the most desirable way.7 The Supreme Court has noted
that it is a goal of the first amendment to produce "an informed public
capable of conducting its own affairs. ... 8 In addition, the Court has
often emphasized the need for a free flow of information, finding it to
be a purpose of the first amendment to preserve "an uninhibited mar-
ketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail. . .. "I
The role of the press in contributing to this interchange of ideas is a
key one. It is one which the Supreme Court has clearly acknowledged:
[Tihe press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally cho-
sen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the
people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the
press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and con-
tend for or against change ...muzzles one of the very agencies the
Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to im-
prove our society and keep it free.' 0
6. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 5, at 885.
7. FREE SPEECH, supra note 5, at 33.
8. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
9. Id. at 390. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (discussion of public issues
integral to operation of system of government); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957) (first amendment designed to assure interchange of ideas to bring about desircd
changes); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 346 (1946) (free discussion a cardinal princi-
ple of "Americanism"); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (widest
possible dissemination of information is essential to the welfare of the public).
10. Mills v. Alabama 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). A similar view was expressed by the
Court in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965): "The free press has been a mighty catalyst
in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public of-
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The press plays its role by providing the information upon which deci-
sions can be based." An informed public depends upon effective re-
porting by the press, for it is often impossible for the individual to
obtain information about government misconduct unless it is provided
by the press.' 2 Indeed, even if such information is available, its full
import is often understood only after extensive discussion by the press.
A prime example is the Watergate affair. Initially, the public, due to a
lack of information, was indifferent. However, after the affair was dis-
cussed and its ramifications developed by the press, the full import be-
came clear to the public, which then reacted.' 3 Thus, in gathering
information the press acts as an agent of the public; it provides the
information and a forum upon which the public relies.' 4
Considerations such as these led the Supreme Court to recognize, in
Grosjean v. American Prss Co., ' the value of "informed public opin-
ion" as "the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment ... .
This recognition has led the Court to strengthen the protections sur-
rounding freedom of the press. The Court has held in several contexts
that the right to receive information and ideas is protected under the
first amendment.' 7 And the Supreme Court has also held in an analo-
ficers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occur-
rences. . . ." As Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted, "[B]y
receiving all the news, the American people can, with intelligence based on knowledge, de-
termine for themselves what policy will best serve them in the retention of their free-
dom. . . ." In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 271, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (1956) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957).
11. [I]n a constitutional point of view [the press'] chief importance is, that it enables the
citizen to bring any person in authority, any public corporation or agency, or even the
government in all its departments, to the bar of public opinion, and to compel him or
them to submit to an examination and criticism of conduct, measures, and purposes in
the face of the world, with a view to the correction or prevention of evils ...
GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 301.
12. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge
of his political responsibilities."). The Supreme Court, recognizing the demands of a mod-
em society, has recently reaffirmed the importance of this role:
[11n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to
observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the
press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations. Great responsi-
bility is accordingly placed upon the news media. . . . Without the information pro-
vided by the press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote
intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
13. For a discussion of the role of the press in this instance, see T. WHITE, BREACH OF
FAITH-THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 222-49 (1975).
14. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
15. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
16. Id. at 250.
17. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (freedoms of speech and press
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gous context that commercial information is protected, finding that so-
ciety may have a "strong interest" in the free flow of such
information.'" However, the Court has not advanced far beyond this
point in defining the scope of the protection for freedom of the press. 19
III. RIGHT OF THE PRESS TO GATHER INFORMATION
A. Early Development of the Right
In 1935, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that freedom of
the press refers to freedom from governmental interference for those
engaged in news gathering and dissemination.2" However, thirty years
elapsed before the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the
existence of the right to gather information in Zemel v. Rusk.
In Zemel, after the Department of State declared passports invalid
for travel to Cuba, appellant, a private individual who had no connec-
tion with the press, sought to have his passport validated for Cuban
travel, claiming that he wanted to be "a better informed citizen."
22
While the Court agreed that the flow of information regarding Cuba
was rendered "less than wholly free" by the travel restriction,2 3 it re-
jected appellant's claim that such a restriction interfered with his first
amendment rights to travel abroad and acquaint himself with the
American policies toward Cuba.24 The Court described the restriction
protect right to receive information); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (right to
receive information regardless of social worth protected); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482-86 (1965) (right to receive birth control information protected); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (free society depends upon right to receive information); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (statute prohibiting door-to-door distribution of
leaflets unconstitutional).
18. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
764 (1976). As the Court explained:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions.
It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and
well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensa-
ble .... And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enter-
prise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how
that system ought to be regulated or altered.
Id. at 765 (citations omitted). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778-80
(1978) (status as corporation does not in itself deny first amendment protection).
19. See Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838, 838-
39 (1971).
20. Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 1935) (dictum), rev'd on other
grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
21. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id.
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as "an inhibition of action" justified by the "weightiest considerations
of national security."25 Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court,
reasoned that "[tihere are few restrictions on action which could not be
clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." 6
However, in a backhanded fashion he also acknowledged the existence
of a right, albeit a limited one, to gather information: "The right to
speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information."' 7 In Zemel, it was considerations of national security
which overcame the right to gather information. While the Court did
not discuss the extent of this right, the fact that it based the right to
gather information upon the right "to speak and publish" implies its
applicability to the press, as well as to private individuals, since it is the
press which "publishes" information. The Court has never held that
freedom of the press is entitled to less protection than freedom of
speech.28
Shortly after its decision in Zemel, the Supreme Court focused its
attention specifically on the press in Estes v. Texas, 9 discussing the
degree of publicity permissible at a criminal trial. In holding that the
television coverage of Billy Sol Estes' trial was a violation of defend-
ant's due process right to a fair trial, the Court noted that although
"maximum freedom" should be allowed the press in informing the citi-
zenry of public events, its exercise of that freedom "must necessarily be
subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial proc-
ess." 30 For the first time, the Court explicitly defined the press' right of
access in terms of the public's right of access: "The television and radio
reporter has the same privilege [of access as does the newspaper re-
porter]. All are entitled to the same rights as the general public. 31 In
his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren also defined the scope of
the media's right of access in terms of the public's right,32 as did Justice
Harlan in his concurring opinion.
33
25. Id.
26. Id. at 16-17.
27. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
28. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) (rights of free press and free speech entitled to same degree of protection). Compare
Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School Sesquientennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974),
reprinted in Stewart, Or ofthe Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (freedom of press provi-
sion provides protections for media over and above those provided by free speech provision)
[hereinafter cited as Stewart].
29. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
30. Id. at 539.
31. Id. at 540.
32. "When representatives of the communications media attend trials they have no
greater rights than other members of the public." Id. at 584 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
33. Unquestionably, television has become a very effective medium for transmitting
1978]
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Thus, it is clear from Estes that, at least in the context of a criminal
trial, the press has a right to gather information, but that right is no
greater than the right of the public. As with Zemel, though, the Court
failed to discuss the extent of this right, finding the right to be out-
weighed in this case by countervailing constitutional considerations.14
The Court recognized a situation in which the media's conduct was the
key-the information could be reported, but the particular manner in
which the media sought access was impermissible as an interference
with the defendant's right to a fair trial.
In 1972, in Branzburg v. Hayes,35 the Supreme Court held that a
newsman does not have the right to refuse to reveal confidential
sources and information to a grand jury. 6 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court recognized the existence of, and need for, a constitutional
basis for protection of news gathering: "Nor is it suggested that news
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated."37 However, the Court rejected the notion that such pro-
tection is unlimited,38 and, citing Zemel, again defined the right of the
press to gather information as coextensive with the public's right to
gather information: "It has generally been held that the First Amend-
ment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special ac-
news. Many trials are newsworthy, and televising them might well provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying their content to the public. Further-
more, television is capable of performing an educational function by acquainting the
public with the judicial process in action.
Id. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring). He concluded:
Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a news-gathering agency may publicize,
within wide limits, what its representatives had heard and seen in the courtroom. But
the line is drawn at the courthouse door, and within, a reporter's constitutional rights
are no greater than those of any other member of the public.
Id.
34. Id. at 539-40.
35. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
36. Id. at 685-86.
37. Id. at 681. If the provision for freedom of the press is to have a meaning, it must
function as more than a guarantee of a right to public information to which the press has
access. As Justice Stewart has observed:
It is tempting to suggest that freedom of the press means only that newspaper publishers
are guaranteed freedom of expression. They are guaranteed that freedom, to be sure,
but so are we all, because of the Free Speech Clause. If the Free Press guarantee meant
no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy.
Stewart, supra note 28, at 633 (emphasis in original). Thus, the freedom of the press provi-
sion has been regarded as providing a constitutional right to gather information.
38. "It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening
of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general
applicability." 408 U.S. at 682.
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cess to information not available to the public generally."39 The Court
cited specific examples to emphasize its point:
Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is reg-
ularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the
meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session, and the
meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right
of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is
excluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or publishing infor-
mation about trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant
a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.4°
Once again the Court failed to discuss the scope of the right.
B. The Needfor Access to Information
After Zemel, Estes, and Branzburg, it is clear that the press has at
least a limited right to gather information.4 The acknowledgment of
this right is a recognition of the fact that freedom of the press requires a
right, at least to some degree, to gather information-the press cannot
inform the public of matters about which it cannot obtain informa-
tion.42 As one district court stated, "[f]reedom to publish news, without
some protected ability to gather it, would render freedom of the press
an unduly gossamer right."43 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
expressed a similar view: "Freedom to cull information is logically an-
tecedent and necessary to any effective exercise of the right to distribute
news. Indeed, the latter prerogative cannot be given full meaning un-
less the former is recognized."'
Because the press cannot publish unless it has the ability to gather
39. Id. at 684.
40. Id. at 684-85. Both the press and the public can be excluded from in camera inspec-
tions of evidence. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974).
41. One district court, citing Zemel and Branzburg, reached this conclusion: "Journalists
and newsmen have a First Amendment right to reasonable access to certain items of news.
That right is of necessity a limited one." Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 775 (M.D. Ala.
1973).
42. See text accompanying notes 7-14 supra. As Justice Musmanno described it:
Freedom of the press is not restricted to the operation of linotype machines and printing
presses. A rotary press needs raw material like a flour mill needs wheat. A print shop
without material to print would be as meaningless as a vineyard without grapes, an
orchard without trees, or a lawn without verdure.
Freedom of the press means freedom to gather news, write it, publish it, and circulate
it. When any one of these integral operations is interdicted, freedom of the press be-
comes a river without water.
In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957).
43. Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 775 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
44. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 977 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
1978]
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information, denial of a right of access to information is the functional
equivalent of a prior restraint upon publication. The Supreme Court
has noted that it is essential "not to limit the protection of [freedom of
the press] to any particular way of abridging it."45 The fact that no
direct restraint is involved "does not determine the question. '46 If the
information is not otherwise available, it would seem that, in practical
terms, the press is restrained from publishing.47 For example, if the
press has access to information, some of which pertains to national se-
curity, it might not be permitted to publish all of the information. But,
the press could publish that information not affecting national security.
However, if the press was not given access to the information, then it
would be unable to publish even the information not affecting national
security. The free flow of information would cease to exist. Thus, de-
nial of a right to gather information could be the most insidious form
of a prior restraint upon publication-members of the press are left
unaware of what it is that they could be publishing.
1. The Prison Access Cases
In 1974, the Supreme Court discussed the right of the press to gather
information in the context of media access to prisons. In Pell v.
Procunier,48 prison inmates and journalists challenged the constitution-
ality of a California regulation prohibiting interviews with prisoners
who had been specificially designated in advance. The prisoners con-
tended that the regulation functioned as an inhibition of free speech.49
The Court rejected this argument, finding that alternative means of
communication existed between the prisoners and persons outside the
prison.50 The journalists in Pell contended that they had a constitu-
tional right, in the absence of a clear and present danger to security or
some other substantial interest of the prison system, to interview any
45. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936) (citing Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 692, 713-16 (1930)).
46. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). See
American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
47. See note 42 supra.
48. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
49. Id. at 821.
50. Id. at 826-28. The Court pointed out that under California prison regulations an
inmate may communicate with others outside the prison by mail. Id. at 824. Such commu-
nication may not be censored unless the decision to do so is accompanied "by minimal
procedural safeguards." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 416-18 (1974). The Court also
noted that inmates could receive limited visits from their families, the clergy, their attorneys,
and friends of prior acquaintance. 417 U.S. at 824-25.
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inmate who was willing to talk with them.5 The Court found that the
regulation was "not part of an attempt by the State to conceal the con-
ditions in its prisons or to frustrate the press' investigation and report-
ing of those conditions;"52 rather, this regulation was designed to meet
security needs.53 The Court, noting that security problems had arisen
in the past at the prison when the press was allowed to interview any
prisoner it chose, emphasized that there was a clear and present danger
to security.5 4 It also noted that "both the press and the general public
[were] accorded full opportunities to observe prison conditions."55 In-
deed, the press actually enjoyed access to the prisons which was un-
available to the general public.56 Thus, according to the Court, the
press had received as much access as it needed. The Court denied the
press' request for greater access without specifying whether or not such
access would be permitted had there been no danger to security.
However, the Court did suggest that the prison could narrow the
press' right of access to a level equal to that of the public. Even though
the press had been granted greater access than had the public, the
Court's position was that such access is not constitutionally mandated:
"[N]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their
inmates beyond that afforded the general public."5 7 The Court pointed
out that while the first and fourteenth amendments protect the press
from government interference with publication, they do not grant the
press a right of access to information greater than that enjoyed by the
public.58 And it concluded that the proposition that "the Constitution
imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to
journalists sources of information not available to members of the pub-
51. 417 U.S. at 829.
52. Id. at 830.
53. Id. at 826-27.
54. Id. at 831-32.
55. Id. at 830 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 830-31. The Court specified the forms of access the press enjoyed which were
not available to the general public:
In addition, newsmen are permitted to visit both the maximum security and minimum
security sections of the institutions and to stop and speak about any subject to any
inmates whom they might encounter. If security considerations permit, corrections per-
sonnel will step aside to permit such interviews to be confidential. Apart from general
access to all parts of the institutions, newsmen are also permitted to enter the prisons to
interview inmates selected at random by the corrections officials. By the same token, if
a newsman wishes to write a story on a particular prison program, he is permitted to sit
in on group meetings and to interview the inmate participants.
Id. at 830.
57. Id. at 834.
58. Id.
1978]
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lic generally"59 is one which "finds no support in the words of the Con-
stitution or in any decision of this Court."60
In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,6 the case decided in tandem with
Pell, the Court faced a factual setting similar to that of Pell. Here,
members of the press were challenging a federal regulation which pro-
hibited interviews with specifically designated prisoners. 2 As in Pell,
the Court noted the existence of "liberal visitation privileges."63 And,
the Court pointed out that the press had access to prisons and prisoners
which "in significant respects exceed[ed] that afforded to members of
the general public."'  The Court also stated that both the press and the
public could use recently released prisoners as information sources
about prison conditions.65
The Court advanced these arguments to show that, as in Pell, prison
authorities were not attempting to conceal prison conditions from the
public.6 6 In fact, the Court found justification for the restriction be-
cause of "substantial disciplinary problems" which tended to result
from inmate contacts with the press.6 7 However, the Court did not un-
dertake to balance such penal interests against the "legitimate de-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 834-35. However, it has been argued that the press, because of the role it plays
in disseminating information to the public, should have a greater right of access, particularly
to prisons:
The prohibition of visits by the public has no practical effect upon their right to know
beyond that achieved by the exclusion of the press. The average citizen is most unlikely
to inform himself about the operation of the prison system by requesting an interview
with a particular inmate with whom he has no prior relationship. He is likely instead,
in a society which values a free press, to rely upon the media for information.
Id. at 841 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens (then Judge) of the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has advanced a similar argument:
Before a democratic society can effectuate drastic institutional changes, the community
at large must be informed about the need for change. That there is inadequate public
awareness of the nature of our penal system, and that the system as a whole needs to be
changed dramatically, are propositions which correctional officials are not likely to
challenge. . . . If the reasons for our faith in the principles embodied in the First
Amendment are valid, it is not unreasonable to infer that there is a causal connection
between those two propositions.
Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1346 n.8 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting), opinion
on rehearing en bane, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
61. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
62. Id. at 844.
63. Id. at 846.
64. Id. at 847. Representatives of the press could tour the prisons, conduct brief inter-
views with any inmates encountered, and photograph any prison facilities. Id. Newsmen
were also allowed to communicate by mail with inmates without fear of censorship, id., and
to interview a randomly selected group of inmates. Id. at 848.
65. Id. at 848.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 848-49.
RIGHT TO GA THER INFORMATION
mands" of the first amendment.68 Such an undertaking was deemed to
be unnecessary in light of the fact that the restriction was merely a
"particularized application" of the general rule that a member of the
public, unassociated with a designated prisoner, may not enter a prison
and demand to speak to that prisoner.69
In place of this balancing approach, the Court set forth a rule which
it seemingly intended to use in discussing all claims under the first
amendment regarding the press' right to gather information, a rule
holding that the press' right to gather information is coextensive with
the public's right to do so.7" Yet, the Court still failed to identify the
scope of the public's right, thereby leaving the dimensions of the press'
right to gather information undefined.
This equation of the rights of the press and the public presents a key
question: Can any denial of press access to information be justified
simply by noting that the public also has no right of access? As Justice
Powell argued in his dissenting opinion in Saxbe:
From all that appears in the Court's opinion, one would think that any
governmental restriction on access to information, no matter how severe,
would be constitutionally acceptable to the majority so long as it does not
single out the media for special disabilities not applicable to the public at
large.7 '
It seems doubtful, though, that such a restriction would be upheld.72
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "[W]e find it hard to
68. Id. at 849.
69. Justice Powell, dissenting, argued that the balancing test employed by the Court in
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 395 (1974), should be used in this situation. 417 U.S. at 835-
42. In Procunier, prisoners challenged mail censorship regulations which proscribed, among
other things, statements which unduly complained or magnified grievances and those which
were "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate." 416 U.S. at 399-400. Justice Powell,
speaking for the Court, found first amendment liberties to be "implicated" in the censorship
of the mail, but also noted that there were several state interests involved in the censorship.
Id. at 409. The state interests included the preservation of internal order and discipline, the
maintenance of security, and rehabilitation of prisoners. Id. at 412. Considering these inter-
ests, Justice Powell declared such censorship justified only if (1) the regulation furthers "an
important or substantial government interest unrelated to suppression of free expression"
and (2) the limitation of first amendment freedoms is no greater than that necessary to pro-
tect the interest involved. Id. at 413.
In applying this test in Saxbe, Justice Powell concluded that while the regulation fur-
thered an important government interest, it was broader than was necessary to protect the
interest involved. 417 U.S. at 868. He therefore would have invalidated the regulation. 417
U.S. at 874.
70. The Court found this case "constitutionally indistinguishable from Pell. . . and thus
fully controlled" by the holding in Pell that newsmen have no greater right of access than
that possessed by the public. 417 U.S. at 850.
71. Id. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting).
72. But see notes 156-75 infra and the accompanying text.
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believe that the Court intended [in Pell and Saxbe] that any govern-
mental restriction on access to sources of information is constitutionally
permissible as long as it applies to the general public as well as the
press."73 One may find it at least inconsistent with a system of demo-
cratic self-rule to allow absolute secrecy in governmental affairs.
2. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
After the decisions in Pell and Saxbe, it is clear that the press has the
right to gather information whenever that right exists for members of
the general public. The Supreme Court emphasized this point in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.74 The Court held that sanctions may not
be imposed on the accurate publication of the identity of a rape victim
obtained from public records.75 In so holding, the Court recognized
the press' right of access to information within the public domain:
"Once true information is disclosed in public court documents open to
public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it."
7 6
The Court was not expanding the press' right of access. It did not re-
quire that the government take affirmative action to provide the press
with information. Instead, the Court merely recognized that the press
could not be discriminated against-if information is made available to
the public, it must be made available to the press.
3. Circuit Court of Appeals Cases
The equation of the press' right of access to information with that of
the public has continued at the appellate court level. In Garrett v.
Estelle,77 a case in which a television reporter petitioned to film the
execution of the first person executed in Texas since 1964, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the protection which the first
amendment provides to the news gathering process does not extend to
matters not accessible to the public generally .... ,T7 The court gave
its analysis of what the Supreme Court meant in Pell and Saxbe:
The Court made no adhoc determination in Saxbe and Pell; it proceeded
from the general principle ... that the press has no greater right of access
to information than does the public at large; and that the first amendment
does not require government to make available to the press information
not available to the public. This principle marks a limit to the first
73. Herald Co. v. McNeal, 553 F.2d 1125, 1131 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977).
74. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
75. Id. at 496-97.
76. Id. at 496.
77. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3142 (1978).
78. Id. at 1276.
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amendment protection of the press' right to gather news.
7 9
With this understanding, the court upheld the denial of access to film
the execution. 0
In another case before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, United
States v. Gurney,8' newspaper reporters sought to examine certain
criminal trial documents, including exhibits not yet admitted into evi-
dence and transcripts of bench conferences held in. camera.8" While
recognizing that the pregs "cannot be denied access to any information
already within the public domain,"8 3 the court upheld the denial of
access, relying upon Zemel, Branzburg, Pell and Garrett as authority.8 4
The court distinguished the denial of access to information from a
prior restraint upon publication, reasoning that no such restriction
"freezing" speech was involved: "The district judge merely refused to
allow the appellants to inspect documents not a matter of public record.
Appellants were free to obtain whatever information they desired from
any source except from the district court and its supporting person-
nel."8 5 According to the court, there were several alternative sources of
information-the parties to the litigation, the attorneys involved in the
case, the witnesses, and members of the public.8 6 However, the court
did not discuss the practicality of these alternatives. It failed to indicate
what information members of the general public might have that the
press did not. And the court failed to discuss the possibility that the
parties, attorneys, and witnesses might not be willing to provide infor-
mation. By limiting the press to these sources of information, the court
might, in effect, have upheld an indirect prior restraint upon publica-
tion. The press may not have been able to publish due to a lack of
information.
In both Garrett and Gurney, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals failed
to define the scope of the right to gather information. Instead, it merely
followed the precedents set by the Supreme Court and noted that the
first amendment right to gather news is defined "in terms of informa-
tion available to the public generally."8"
79. Id. at 1278.
80. Id. at 1279.
81. 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1606 (1978).
82. Id. at 1207.
83. Id. at 1208.
84. Id. (footnote omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1208 n.8.
87. 558 F.2d at 1208 (footnote omitted).
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IV. THE 1977 SUPREME COURT TERM
In its October 1977 term, the Supreme Court issued three decisions
which are relevant to discussion of the press' right to gather informa-
tion.
A. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,88 the media sought to
copy tape recordings of conversations held in then-President Nixon's
offices which were introduced into evidence in United States v.
Mitchell,89 the trial of seven individuals for conspiracy to obstruct jus-
tice in connection with the investigation of the 1972 burglary of the
Democratic National Committee Headquarters.9" Copies of the rele-
vant portions of the original tapes were made. During the trial, these
copies, over twenty-two hours in length, were played for the jury and
public in the courtroom. The district court furnished the jurors, report-
ers, and members of the public in attendance with transcripts prepared
by the special prosecutor. These transcripts were widely reprinted by
the press.91
Six weeks after the trial had begun, broadcasters filed a motion seek-
ing permission to "copy, broadcast, and sell to the public" the portions
of the tapes played at the trial.92 The motion was granted, with copying
prohibited until after the trial.93 However, after the trial, media re-
quests for immediate access to the tapes were denied on the ground that
those appealing the trial verdict could have their rights prejudiced if
the petitions were granted.94 On appeal, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reversed the decision, stressing the importance of the
common-law privilege to inspect and copy judicial records.95
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the release of the tapes to
the media was not required.96 The Court, while acknowledging a com-
mon-law right to inspect and copy judicial records, found that this right
is not absolute.97 The Court also acknowledged the difficulty of pro-
viding a "comprehensive" definition of the common-law right of access
88. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
89. 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D.D.C. 1974).
90. 435 U.S. at 592.
91. Id. at 594.
92. Id.
93. 386 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D.D.C. 1974).
94. 397 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D.D.C. 1975).
95. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1257-59 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
96. 435 U.S. at 610-11.
97. Id. at 597-98.
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and of identifying the factors to be weighed in determining whether
access is appropriate, concluding that the decision as to access is "best
left to the sound discretion" of the trial court.98
The Court, after assuming arguendo that the common-law right ap-
plied to the tapes in question,99 listed the interests that would normally
be balanced in determining whether or not access should be granted.
The interests advanced by the broadcasters favoring release of the tapes
were the gain in public understanding that would result from their re-
lease and the presumption favoring access; the interests advanced by
Nixon, the petitioner, against release of the tapes were his property in-
terest in the sound of his own voice, infringement upon his privacy if
the tapes were released, and the fact that United States v. Nixon"0 au-
thorized only a very limited use of subpoenaed presidential conversa-
tions.102 However, the Court did not decide how the balance would be
struck among these interests. Instead, it noted the existence of the Pres-
idential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 0 3 which provides
for "legislative and executive appraisal of the most appropriate means
of assuring public access to the material, subject to prescribed safe-
guards." ° The existence of this act, the Court held, "tip[ped] the
scales in favor of denying release."'
' 0 5
The Court failed to indicate if the result would have been the same
in the absence of the statute. And it did not discuss what would happen
if the Administrator of General Services did not release the tapes. It
would seem, though, that the result should be different. Nixon did au-
thorize only a limited use of the conversations; the Court wanted to
ensure that only relevant information which would be admissible at the
trial was released and published.0 6 However, this consideration
should not apply in determining whether to allow the recordings actu-
ally used in the trial to be sold and broadcast-transcripts of the infor-
mation had already been published and members of the public would
hear nothing more than they would have heard had they attended the
trial. The concern for petitioner's privacy was also minimized by the
fact that transcripts of the tapes had been released. In reality, there-
98. Id. at 598-99.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 602.
101. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
102. 435 U.S. at 601.
103. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3315-3324 (1976).
104. 435 U.S. at 604-05.
105. Id. at 606.
106. 418 U.S. at 714-16.
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fore, petitioner's property interest in the sound of his voice would be
balanced against the gain in public understanding and the presumption
favoring access. Given the strong policy favoring the free flow of infor-
mation, the gain in public understanding is probably as important, or
more important, than petitioner's property interest. And, the presump-
tion favoring access would place the burden of proof upon the peti-
tioner. Under these circumstances, it seems likely that the balance
would be struck in favor of access.
The broadcasters also argued that the release of the tapes was re-
quired under the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.7
The broadcasters, relying upon Cox Broadcasting, contended that the
press had a right of access to exhibits and materials displayed in open
court, in this case a right to copy and publish that material.' The
Court rejected this argument, saying that the broadcasters "miscon-
ceived" the holding in Cox Broadcasting:
Our decision in that case merely affirmed the right of the press to publish
accurately information contained in court records open to the public.
Since the press serves as the information-gathering agent of the public, it
could not be prevented from reporting what it had learned and what the
public was entitled to know.10 9
The Warner Communications Court found that the press had fully exer-
cised this right:
In the instant case . . . there is no claim that the press was precluded
from publishing or utilizing as it saw fit the testimony and exhibits filed in
evidence. There simply were no restrictions upon press access to, or pub-
lication of any information in the public domain. . . .The contents of
the tapes were given wide publicity by all elements of the media. There is
no question of a truncated flow of information to the public." 0
Thus, the Court reaffirmed the importance of a "free flow of informa-
tion" and, in doing so, had recognized once again the role of the press
as the information-gathering agent of the public.
However, it is questionable as to whether the Court applied these
theories in this case. It is clear that the press had access to the informa-
tion in question. What the broadcasters actually sought was physical
access to the tapes. The Court denied this request, holding that the first
amendment "generally grants the press no right to information about a
107. 435 U.S. at 608. The broadcasters also argued that the sixth amendment's guarantee
of a public trial mandated the release of the tapes. The Court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that the sixth amendment did not require that "the trial--or any part of it-be broadcast
live or on tape to the public." Id. at 610.
108. Id. at 608-09.
109. Id. at 609.
110. Id.
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trial superior to that of the general public."" I I By so holding, the Court
avoided dealing with the issue of whether physical access to the tapes
should have been granted to the press. The release of recordings of the
tapes would have provided the public with information which the re-
lease of the transcripts did not provide. Transcripts merely indicate
what was said, not how it was said. The listener can notice emotions
reflected in the speakers' voices and can hear intonations and hesita-
tions which would not be apparent if the words were only read and not
heard. By hearing the words spoken, the listener can get a better un-
derstanding of what transpired. Physical access to the tapes would
therefore serve to promote the free flow of information to the public.
Thus, Warner Communications presents a situation which is similar
to that presented in Pell and Saxbe. In these three cases, it is unclear
whether the information to which the press had sought access was ever
communicated to the public. And, in these cases the Court failed to
discuss whether the information sought should have been communi-
cated to the public.
B. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia
Shortly after its decision in Warner Communications, the Supreme
Court announced its decision in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia.- In Landmark, the Court faced the question of whether a
state may subject persons to criminal sanctions for divulging informa-
tion about proceedings before a judicial review commission which are
declared confidential by state law.'" 3 A newspaper had identified a
judge whose conduct was being investigated by the commission. Sub-
sequently, the newspaper was indicted for violating this law. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision convicting the
newspaper.' 14
The Supreme Court reversed the Virginia conviction. It emphasized
that a major purpose of the first amendment is to protect free discus-
sion of governmental affairs."' It saw the newspaper and article in
question as playing an important role in contributing to the free flow of
information:
The operation of the Virginia Commission ... is a matter of public
111. Id. In support of this decision, the Court cited Estes, Zemel Pell, and Saxbe. Id. at
609-10.
112. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
113. Id. at 830.
114. Id. at 832.
115. Id. at 838-39.
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interest, necessarily engaging the attention of the news media. The article
published by Landmark provided accurate factual information about a
legislatively authorized inquiry pending before the Judicial Review and
Inquiry Commission, and in so doing clearly served those interests in
public scrutiny and discussion of governmental affairs which the First
Amendment was adopted to protect.
16
Thus, the vitality of the "free flow of information" goal of the first
amendment remains undiminished.
The Court pointed out that this case involved no claim for any "con-
stitutionally compelled right of access" for the press.'" 7 And the major-
ity agreed with the Virginia Supreme Court that the statute did not
constitute a prior restraint upon publication."" However, it deter-
mined that the publication sought to be punished lay "near the core of
the first amendment" and that the interests advanced by the imposition
of criminal sanctions were insufficient to justify encroachments upon
the freedom of the press."19
While it is clear that the conviction of the newspaper should have
been overturned in this case, the Court's holding presents an irony. In
past cases, the Court had rejected the press' attempts to gain access to
information by legal means. Yet, here the Court upheld the press' right
to publish the information, even though this information was obtained
in violation of a state statute. The Court's actions seem to suggest that
if the press seeks access to information to which the public does not
have access, it will not get it, but if the press obtains the information,
even by means illegal at the time of acquisition, it cannot be stopped
from publishing it. This is reflective of the Court's treatment of claims
by the press for access as demands that the government affirmatively
provide information, rather than as requests that government not inter-
fere with press attempts to gather information. While the distinction is
a thin one which often rests on semantics rather than analysis, it has
served to allow the Court to summarily reject press requests for access
to information without considering whether such access is war-
ranted.' 20
116. Id. at 839.
117. Id. at 837-38.
118. I1d. at 838.
119. Id. The Court questioned the relevance of the clear and present danger test used by
the Virginia Supreme Court in balancing the interests of the first amendment and those
involved in the need for confidentiality. Id. at 842-43. However, the Court concluded that
even if this test was used, the risk here fell "far short" of presenting a "clear and present"
danger. Id. at 845.
120. The Court used this approach in Pell. It viewed the press' request for access as one
which, if granted, would impose upon the government the affirmative duty of making infor-
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C Houchins v. KQED, Inc.
The last case in the Supreme Court's October 1977 term to deal with
freedom of the press and the right to gather information was Houchins
v. KQED, Inc. 1
21
1. Facts of the Case
In March of 1975, KQED's radio and television stations reported the
suicide of a prisoner in the Greystone portion of the Santa Rita jail.
KQED requested permission to inspect and photograph the Greystone
facility. When this request was denied by Sheriff Houchins, KQED
filed suit,'22 claiming that the denial of access violated first amendment
protections by denying effective means by which the public could be
informed of prison conditions or learn of prisoners' grievances.' 23
After the suit was filed, a program of six monthly tours of the prison
was announced. Members of the news media were given notice in ad-
vance of the public, and several reporters, including a KQED reporter,
were on the first tour.'24 The tours did not include disciplinary cells or
the Greystone facility, the subject of the KQED report and the site of
"alleged rapes, beatings, and adverse physical conditions."'125 No cam-
eras or tapes were allowed on the tours, and interviews with inmates
were prohibited.'26 KQED argued that these tours were inadequate be-
cause of their limited nature and because, once the tours were filled,
members of the media who had not signed up for them had no access to
the jail.'27
The district court accepted KQED's arguments and issued a prelimi-
nary injunction, barring Houchins from denying "responsible repre-
mation available. 417 U.S. at 834-35. Yet, the Court failed to explain why the request
would impose such a duty. It did not explain why the situation was not one in which the
government was interfering with the efforts of the press to gather information. The situation
would seem to be one of governmental interference, for the Court had noted in Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 395 (1974), that prisoners had a right to communicate with the press and
the press had a right to receive communications from the prisoners. Id. at 408-09. Argua-
bly, one form of communication would be interviews with the prisoners.
121. 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978).
122. The Alameda and Oakland branches of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People were also plaintiffs in the suit. The suit was filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which provides that any person who, under the color of state law,
deprives an American citizen of his constitutional rights shall be liable in an action at law or
equity or for any other appropriate relief.
123. 98 S. Ct. at 2591.
124. Id. These tours were filled within a week after they were announced. Id. at 2592.
125. Id. at 2592.
126. Id. Indeed, the inmates were usually "removed from view."
127. Id.
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sentatives" of the media access to the prison facilities, including
Greystone, and from preventing media representatives from
photographing facilities and interviewing inmates.1 28 The court con-
strued Pell as requiring media exclusion from prisons only when its
presence would create burdensome security and administrative
problems.129
Sheriff Houchins filed an appeal, arguing that the district court had
departed from Pell and abused its discretion in ordering that greater
access be given to the press than was provided the public.' 30 Judge
Pregerson,13 1 speaking for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, found
that Pell did not "stand for the proposition that the correlative constitu-
tional rights of the public and the news media to visit a prison must be
implemented identically."' 32 He acknowledged that the public and the
press have "an equal constitutional right of access" to prisons, 33 but
concluded that, due to differing needs and administrative problems,
common sense "mandates that the implementation of those correlative
rights not be identical."
1 34
Judge Duniway concurred in the disposition of the case. He ac-
cepted the proposition that "only the media, as distinguished from the
submerged, often alienated, and often frightened individual, can be
counted on to dig out and disseminate the facts about the public's busi-
ness." 135 However, he admitted that he could not reconcile this propo-
sition nor the result of the Houchins case with the decisions in Pell and
Saxbe. 1
36
Judge Hufstedler, concurring, interpreted Pell and Saxbe as mean-
ing that the press does not have a right of access to obtain information
that the public cannot obtain. 137 She argued that because prison condi-
tions are of great public importance, newsmen, as the "eyes and ears of
the public," are "entitled to see and hear everything within the institu-
tion about which the general public is entitled to be informed."'
' 38
Judge Hufstedler reasoned that since the media is better able to collate
and communicate information to the general public, restrictions on me-
128. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 18 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2252 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
129. Id. at 2253.
130. 98 S. Ct. at 2593.
131. Judge Pregerson, a district court judge, was sitting by designation.
132. 546 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1976).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 294.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 295.
138. Id. at 295-96.
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dia access should be different than those governing access by members
of the general public.'39 Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
viewed the press as being entitled to a different form of access than that
to which the public is entitled, a form which would allow the press to
carry out its function of gathering information for the public.
2. Holding and Reasoning
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the dis-
trict court and the court of appeals, remanding the case for further pro-
ceedings. 4 ° The Court agreed with KQED's assertions that prison
conditions are matters of public importance.14' It conceded that
"[b]eyond question" the role of the media in gathering information is
important. 42 But, the Court also stated that it has "never intimated a
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of infor-
mation within government control."'
143
The plurality discussed Grosjean and Mills v. Alabama'" as cases
emphasizing the importance of informed public opinion and the role of
the press as a source of public information. 145 But, it found Grosjean
and Mills to be concerned with the media's freedom to communicate
information once it is obtained, rather than with a right to gather infor-
mation. 
46
The Court then advanced to a discussion of Branzburg, Pell, Saxbe,
and Zemel. These cases, the Court explained, "negate any notion" that
the first amendment confers on the press a right of access to informa-
tion beyond that available to the general public. 147 According to the
Court, the issue was a claimed "special privilege of access which the
Court rejected in Pell and Saxbe, a right which is not essential to guar-
antee the freedom to communicate or publish."'' 48 However, the Court
139. Id. at 296.
140. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, delivered the opinion
of the court. Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion. Justices Brennan and Powelljoined
in Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not take part in
the decision.
141. 98 S. Ct. at 2593.
142. Id. at 2594.
143. Id.
144. 384 U.S. 214 (1966). In this case the Supreme Court held that the free press guaran-
tee prohibited a state from imposing criminal sanctions on a newspaper editor for writing
and publishing an editorial on election day urging people to vote a certain way.
145. 98 S. Ct. at 2594.
146. Id. at 2594-95.
147. Id. at 2595.
148. Id. at 2596. The validity of this statement is doubtful. See note 42 supra.
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offered no explanation as to why the right of access is not essential to
the freedom to publish. Furthermore, the Court misconstrued KQED's
claims. KQED was not seeking a special right of access. Its claim was
that the first amendment was violated by both the refusal to permit
media access and the failure to provide an effective means by which the
public could obtain information about prison conditions. 149 By phras-
ing the issue as it did, the Court avoided defining a right of access for
the press in terms other than the public's right of access.
The Court also suggested that the question of access to prisons was
"a question of policy," the resolution of which is a legislative task.' 50
Such an undertaking by the Court, it reasoned, would be improper.15'
However, because the question of access to prisons involves considera-
tion of first amendment protections, such an undertaking would be a
proper function of the Court. The Supreme Court has long been re-
garded as an appropriate forum for consideration of claimed violations
of first amendment freedoms.1
5 2
As a final basis for its decision, the Court cited the existence of other
means of informing the public about prison conditions. Such means
included citizen task forces, prison visitation committees, and grand ju-
ries with subpoena power.' 53 Beyond this, the Court also stressed alter-
natives by which the press could learn about prison conditions.
154
Specifically, the Court said that members of the press have a first
amendment right to receive letters from inmates, are free to interview
those who render legal assistance to inmates, and are free to seek out
former inmates, visitors, and institutional personnel. 5 5 These alterna-
tives, the plurality felt, were sufficient to provide the press with the in-
149. 98 S. Ct. at 2591.
150. Id. at 2596. Congress had indeed taken steps to provide for access to information in
some contexts. For example, under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976),
"any person" may obtain certain non-confidential government records, and under the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), a person has a right of access to government
records on himself or herself. Members of the press can thus seek access to information
under either of these statutes. However, agencies have hampered access to their records
through delay and other tactics. See Nader, Freedom from Information. The Act and the
Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1 (1970). And, the press has been reluctant to use the
Act due to the delays from waiting for court decisions and the costs of litigation. See
Kohlmeier, The Journalisi's Viewpoint, 23 AD. L. REv. 143 (1971).
151. 98 S. Ct. at 2596.
152. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (first amendment rights
are in "preferred position").
153. 98 S. Ct. at 2596.
154. Id. at 2597. The Court admitted that these alternatives might not be as convenient as
members of the press would desire, but noted that Sheriff Houchins could not prevent the
press from employing them. Id.
155. Id.
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formation it might need. However, the Court merely noted the
existence of these sources of information. It did not show them to be
effective as a means of conveying information to the public. Indeed,
the lack of information available to the public about the conditions in
Greystone suggests that these sources of information were inadequate.
As for the alternatives by which the press could learn about prison con-
ditions, there was no showing that this information had been, or could
be, obtained from letters from prisoners or from those individuals who
rendered legal assistance to inmates. There was no discussion of the
ability of former inmates to provide information about current condi-
tions in Greystone, nor was there an indication that institutional per-
sonnel would be willing to discuss those conditions. Finally, there was
no discussion of how visitors would be able to convey information
about the conditions in Greystone when members of the public were
excluded from that portion of the prison. Thus, the alternatives the
Court mentioned clearly fail to approach the level of effectiveness of
the alternatives which were available in Pell and Saxbe.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Powell, issued
a strong dissent. He pointed out that, as the Court conceded, there was
a need for information about the conditions of the Santa Rita Jail.156
The need was clearly significant, for, as the district court reported, the
conditions at Greystone "were truly deplorable."' 57 The conditions
were characterized as "shocking and debasing," "subhuman," and vio-
lative of "basic standards of human decency"; 58 the district court's "in-
escapable conclusion" was that "Greystone should be razed to the
ground."1
5 9
Justice Stevens argued that the public should be informed about
these conditions and that the press should not be barred from having
access to Greystone to examine them. He noted that the decision in
Pell was based in part upon the fact that officials were not attempting
to conceal prison conditions.' 60 Here, given the conditions at Grey-
stone as described by the district court, it is possible that access was
denied as a means of concealing those conditions.
Justice Stevens also pointed out that in Pell the media actually en-
joyed greater access to the prison than did members of the general pub-
156. Id. at 2599 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 840 (1974)
(prisons are a public responsibility and the public needs to know of their effectiveness).
157. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 98 S. Ct. 2604 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 52 & 53 supra.
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lic;' 61 and that the flow of information to the public was "adequate to
survive constitutional challenge."' 162 Here, prior to the commencement
of the litigation, restrictions on access to Greystone and other areas of
the prison concealed the conditions from the general public. 163 After
the litigation began and the program of public tours was introduced,
access was still inadequate since the tours covered only limited areas of
the prison. 64
To Justice Stevens, the question eventually was one of the public's
right to be informed about prison conditions. He appears to be correct
in this determination, for the plurality, by saying that the press was not
entitled to the degree of access it was seeking because the public had no
such right of access, was in effect denying that the public has a right to
know about such conditions. 65 Justice Stevens acknowledged that on
some occasions governmental activity may be carried on in secrecy,
166
but he concluded that there was "no legitimate, penological justifica-
tion for concealing from citizens the conditions in which their fellow
citizens are being confined."' 67 Therefore, he held that the freedom of
the press protected by the first and fourteenth amendments had been
abridged in this case.
168
Having decided that first amendment rights were abridged, Justice
Stevens proceeded to consider the injunction entered by the district
court. He acknowledged that the press and the public have an equal
right of access to information. 169 But, reasoning that "different meth-
ods of remedying a violation of that right may sometimes be needed,"
161. 98 S. Ct. at 2604.
162. Id. at 2607.
163. Id.
164. See text accompanying notes 125-27 supra. Justice Stevens also argued that the es-
tablishment of the tour program did not preclude review of the previous policy of virtually
total exclusion of both the public and the press from areas in the jail where inmates were
confined. 98 S. Ct. at 2602-03. Since there was no guarantee that the tours would continue
without the issuance of the preliminary injunction, such review seems appropriate. Id. at
2603.
165. The Court stated: "We, therefore, reject the Court of Appeals' conclusory assertion
that the public and the media have a First Amendment right to government information
regarding the conditions of jails and their inmates and presumably all other public facilities
such as hospitals and mental institutions." Id. at 2597.
166. Id. at 2607 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2608. He pointed out that prisons are "public institutions, financed with pub-
lic funds and administered by public servants" and are an "integral component of the crimi-
nal justice system." Id. He also noted that a substantial number of inmates in the Santa
Rita Jail are pretrial detainees and that, as such, society has a "special interest" in ensuring
that they are treated in accord with their status. Id. at 2608-09.
168. Id. at 2609.
169. Id.
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he concluded that the preliminary relief granted by the distrijct court
was appropriate.
70
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment of the Court. Unlike the
plurality, Justice Stewart believed that KQED was entitled to injunc-
tive relief, but of a more limited nature than that granted by the district
court.' "IHe agreed with the Court's view that the press enjoys a right
of access equal to that of the public. However, he believed that the
concept of "equal access" must be accorded flexibility.172 He recog-
nized the role played by the press in providing information to the pub-
lic and suggested that the terms of access for the public and the press
could therefore vary:
A person touring Santa Rita Jail can grasp its reality with his own eyes
and ears. But if a television reporter is to convey the jail's sights and
sounds to those who cannot personally visit the place, he must use cam-
eras and sound equipment. In short, terms of access that are reasonably
imposed on individual members of the public may, if they impede effec-
tive reporting without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied
to journalists who are there to convey to the general public what the visi-
tors see. 1
73
According to Justice Stewart, the press' right of access is no greater
than that of the public; but, the form of access granted to the press may
be different. The press must be able to effectively gather information to
convey to the public. For Justice Stewart, the question was thus one of
"effective access."' 174 And he rejected the notion that the tours pro-
vided such access, concluding that he would not "foreclose the possibil-
ity of further relief for KQED on remand."'
175
Thus, it is possible that KQED will receive some form of injunctive
relief in the future, since four of the seven Justices participating in this
decision manifested beliefs that KQED should be granted greater ac-
cess than that provided by the public tours. However, once again the
Court has issued a decision in which the press' right of access to infor-
mation is defined in terms of the public's right of access. And, once
again the public's right of access is undefined, leaving the scope of the
press' right unestablished. However, since four members of the
Houchins Court favored greater access for the press than was actually
170. Id. at 2609-10.
171. Id. at 2598 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart felt that the injunction was
overbroad in that it granted the press access to areas and sources of information from which




175. Id. at 2599.
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provided, the holding of the Court loses much of its precedential value
as a limitation of the press' right of access to that of the public's right.
For the first time, a majority of the Supreme Court justices has indi-
cated a willingness to allow the press to have greater access to informa-
tion than that of the public, a willingness based upon the realizations
that the press acts as an agent of the public in gathering information
and that the real question is one of "effective access."
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH: THE CONTENT-CONDUCT TEST
It would seem that when an issue is a matter of public importance,
the press should be granted aright of access to the necessary informa-
tion in order to convey it to the public. However, it must be acknowl-
edged that not all types of information should be communicated.
176
The question thus becomes one of determining to which information
the press may be allowed access.
Under the Supreme Court's current approach, this determination is
made by examining the scope of the public's right of access-there is
no constitutional mandate for the press to have a right of access which
is greater .than that granted to the public. While such an approach is
straightforward, it involves inherent difficulties. The public commonly
relies upon the press as its source of information. 177 When the press is
denied the right to gather information, it is the public which remains
ill-informed, contrary to the goal of a free flow of information. When
the public has a right to know, but is denied access on the basis of
practical problems (due, for example, to the sheer size of the general
public), the press also may be denied access, even though access by one
representative would often be adequate to convey the desired informa-
tion to the general public.
It is therefore suggested that a more desirable approach would be
one which is similar to that employed by the Court in dealing with
prior restraints upon publication. In Near v. Minnesota, 78 the Court
found the concept of prior restraints to be opposed to the chief purpose
of the first amendment. 179 As such, prior restraints are subject to a
stricter standard of review than are other infringements upon first
amendment rights. Any system of prior restraints bears "a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity."' 80 Such an approach
176. See note 40 supra.
177. See notes 11-14 supra and the accompanying text.
178. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
179. Id. at 713.
180. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
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would be justified in the information-gathering area because a denial of
access to information functions as the equivalent of a prior restraint
upon publication.'
Application of this approach to the information-gathering area
would mean that the government would bear the burden of justifying
its denial of press access to information. The government should be
held to have met this burden only upon satisfaction of one part of a
bifurcated test, the content-conduct test.
Under the first part of this test, the focus is on the content of the
information. Denial of press access to the information will be upheld
under this part of the test only if the content of the information is such
that publication would seriously threaten the public good or welfare.
Given the strong policy against any system which functions as a prior
restraint, such a threat would be extremely difficult to establish. An
example of the difficulty involved may be found in the national security
area. A generalized claim of national security would not be enough to
validate a denial of access. This result was demonstrated by the
Supreme Court's rejection of a national security claim in New York
Times Co. v. United States.82 In New York Times, the Court dismissed
a temporary restraining order against publication of a classified study
on United States policy-making in Viet Nam, holding that the govern-
ment had not met its burden of justification. 83 However, as the Court
earlier recognized, a prior restraint could be upheld if necessary to pre-
vent "publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops" in a time of war.'84 In the latter situation, the threat
to public welfare is much stronger and more direct. The danger to the
public welfare from publication of information about troop locations in
a time of war is obvious. Thus, it is only in exceptional circumstances
that the content of the information may justify the denial to the press of
access to information. If such circumstances are found to exist, though,
all forms of access sought by the press which are greater than those
granted to the public may be denied. However, if the public is given a
right of access to the information, the press must be given the same
right.
Under the second part of this test, the focus is on conduct. Denial of
access by the press to information will be upheld under this part of the
test only if the means of gathering information significantly interfere
181. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
182. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
183. Id. at 714.
184. 283 U.S. at 716.
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with either the constitutional rights of others or a compelling govern-
ment interest. However, a determination that one form of access (for
example, interviews with specifically designated prisoners) is impermis-
sible under this part of the test does not mean that another form of
access (for example, interviews with prisoners randomly selected) is
also impermissible. Each form of access must be subjected to this test
before it can be deemed impermissible. An example of a situation in
which the conduct of the press would warrant the denial of access to
information is found in Estes. In Estes, the media sought to televise the
trial. It already had access to the trial inasmuch as the press was al-
lowed to report and publish information about the trial. Such access
was deemed permissible. However, the additional access in the form of
televising the trial was found to interfere with the conduct of the trial
and to breach the defendant's right to a fair trial.' 85 Therefore, this
additional access was denied.
The effect of the adoption of this content-conduct test can be shown
by examining its application to the cases involving media access to pris-
ons. In Pell and Saxbe, it is clear that the information sought was not
such that its content warranted a denial of access to the information.
The government's basis for denying access was the effect upon security
and discipline which would result if access by the press were permitted.
Because there was no threat to the public welfare, no bar to access
could have been imposed under the first part of the test. However, de-
nial of the press' requests to interview specifically designated prisoners
would be upheld under the second part of the test. In those cases, the
government did demonstrate that severe disciplinary problems would
arise if these requests were granted. 186 Since no such showing was
made as to the other forms of access which the press was allowed, the
government could not bar those forms.
In Houchins, as in Pell and Saxbe, access to Greystone could not be
denied under the content part of the test. However, the considerations
regarding conduct are different. In Houchins, the press was not given a
greater degree of access than the public. Neither the press nor mem-
bers of the general public were permitted access to certain areas of the
prison. While security considerations were claimed to be the basis for
this denial of access, the government indicated potential security
problems only from interviews with prisoners.' 87 If the interference
was found to be significant, the right of the press to interview prisoners
185. 381 U.S. at 542-43.
186. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 831-32.
187. 98 S. Ct. at 2592.
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could be limited. However, since no interference with the govern-
ment's security interest was demonstrated from tours of prison facili-
ties,'88 Sheriff Houchins could not deny the press a right of access to the
Greystone facilities. Thus, the media would be able to inspect, and
perhaps even film, the conditions in those facilities. Information about
the conditions would be conveyed to the public, thereby furthering the
free flow of information.
VI. CONCLUSION
Freedom of the press should mandate the recognition of a right, in-
dependent of the public's right, for the press to gather information.
The failure to recognize such a right would create, in effect, a restraint
upon what the press could publish. Given the goal of a free flow of
information so that the public can be well-informed, and given the im-
portance of the press in contributing to this flow of information, the
recognition by the Supreme Court in recent cases of at least a limited
right to gather information is a beginning. But, by merely defining the
press' right of access to information in terms of the public's right of
access, the Court leaves the real possibility that the press will be denied
access to information at a time when such information should be com-
municated to the general public. Houchins is such a possibility real-
ized.
However, the decision in Houchins indicates that the Court may
finally be ready to define, at least in the circumstances of that case, the
press' right to gather information in terms other than just those of the
public's right to gather information.
It is suggested that the Court adopt the content-conduct test. Such a
step is necessary, for the right to gather information is critical to main-
taining freedom of the press. Regardless of how strong the right to
communicate information may be, the press cannot communicate in-
formation to which it does not have access. Ultimately, the question is
one of the public's right to know. For, if the press is without a right to
gather information in a setting where the public is also without such a
right, and in which there are no adequate alternate means of communi-
cating this information, then the public will not "know."
Kirk Alan Pasich
188. Id. The Sheriff also argued that unregulated access would invade inmates' privacy
and that unscheduled tours would disrupt jail operations. Id. These problems could be
avoided by simply scheduling media visits in advance.
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